



Actors Fund ☞ African Services Committee ☞ Children's Defense Fund-New York
Community Service Society of New York ☞ Consumers Union ☞ Empire Justice Center
Make the Road New York ☞ Medicare Rights Center ☞ Metro New York Health Care for All Campaign
New Yorkers for Accessible Health Coverage ☞ New York Immigration Coalition ☞ Project CHARGE
Public Policy and Education Fund of New York/Citizen Action of New York
Raising Women's Voices-New York ☞ Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy ☞ Young Invincibles

July 1, 2019

Linda A. Lacewell, Superintendent
Troy Oechsner, Deputy Superintendent for Health
John Powell, Assistant Deputy Superintendent for Health
NYS Department of Financial Services
One Commerce Plaza
Albany, NY 12257

RE: Requested Rate Changes – Healthfirst—HLFT-131929375

Dear Superintendent Lacewell, Deputy Superintendent Oechsner, and Assistant Deputy Superintendent Powell:

Health Care for All New York (HCFANY) is a statewide coalition of over 170 organizations dedicated to achieving quality, affordable health coverage for all New Yorkers. HCFANY believes that the public rate review process is a vital consumer protection. We are grateful for the opportunity to submit comments and encourage consumers all over New York to do the same each year.

The comments below first address concerns about the market as a whole and second offer comments on the 6 percent increase requested by the Healthfirst PHSP.

I. Market-Wide Conditions

A. State Action is Needed to Continue Increasing Enrollment in the Individual Market

New York has successfully cut its uninsured rate in half since the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), from 10 percent to 5 percent.¹ This has been in part due to New York's robust embrace of the ACA, including the proactive and aggressive steps taken by State leaders to counter recent federal threats to the individual insurance market. Those steps include codifying the ACA into state law, continual efforts to create a seamless enrollment process, and investment in in-person assistance. Even though enrollment in Qualified Health Plans has declined in other states, on the New York Marketplace enrollment in Qualified Health Plans has

¹ New York State of Health, 2019 Open Enrollment Report, May 2019,
https://info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/sites/default/files/NYSOH%202019%20Open%20Enrollment%20Report_0.pdf.



increased three years in a row.² Experts attribute the enrollment increases seen in 2018 and 2019 to this leadership.³

| | On-Exchange | Off-Exchange | Total | Percent Change |
|-------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| 2017 | 223,705 | 124,004 | 347,709 | |
| 2018 | 237,191 | 91,593 | 328,784 | -5.4% |
| 2019 | 254,634 | 71,272 | 325,906 | -0.9% |

HCFANY urges the state to carefully review the carriers’ 2020 submissions and reject any increases based on the alleged degradation of the individual market—which simply did not happen. Each year, the carriers have incorrectly predicted eroding market conditions to justify large rate increases (most recently due to the elimination of the individual mandate tax penalty). And each year, these predictions do not materialize. It is true that there was a slight drop-off in off-exchange enrollment last year. However, an increase in on-exchange enrollment made up the difference, and the actual combined decline was less than one percent.

That said, the State could take actions to grow—not just stabilize—New York’s individual market. There are more than a million New Yorkers remaining without health insurance. Table 2 indicates that health coverage is strongly associated with income, indicating that current prices are unaffordable to many New Yorkers.⁵ Particularly relevant to enrollment in the individual market is the steep affordability cliff when eligibility for the public Essential Plan ends and consumers must shop for a private Qualified Health Plan. HCFANY commends the New York State of Health for its efforts to keep plans affordable, including the lower deductible that will be available to people who enroll in Silver plans next year. Nevertheless, individuals making just \$25,000 a year (just over the Essential Plan cutoff) must pay around \$1,800 annually in premiums for a plan with a \$1,350 deductible. That’s over 12 percent of their gross income before they can use their coverage. This cost is unmanageable for many and simply not worth it for others.

| Income as Percent of Federal Poverty Level (Individuals) | % of NY’s Uninsured |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <138% (\$17,235) | 32% |
| 138% -199% (\$17,236 - \$24,855) | 16% |
| 200 - 399% (\$24,856 – \$49,835) | 32% |
| 400 - 599% (49,835 - \$74,815) | 12% |

² New York State of Health, Open Enrollment reports for 2017, 2018, and 2019.

³ Rachel Schwab and Sabrina Corlette, “ACA Marketplace Open Enrollment Numbers Reveal the Impact of State-Level Policy and Operational Choices on Performance, April 16, 2019, The Commonwealth Fund, <https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/aca-marketplace-open-enrollment-numbers-reveal-impact>.

⁴ Data provided by the New York State Department of Financial Services.

⁵ American Community Survey, Health Insurance Status and Type of Coverage All People, 2008-2016.



| | |
|---------------------------|----|
| Over 600% (Over \$74,816) | 8% |
|---------------------------|----|

HCFANY is also concerned about the number of New Yorkers who have insurance but say they still cannot afford care.⁶ Insurance degradation is real.⁷ In just a few years, premiums and deductibles have increased from 5.5 percent to 7.7 percent of an average New York family’s income. And nearly half of New Yorkers who have insurance are going without medications or treatment. If this continues, many New Yorkers may decide to stop buying health insurance altogether.

To address this coverage crisis, New York can follow the lead of California, New Jersey, and other states by taking two important steps beyond the rate review process.

First, New York should create an individual mandate. Any revenue generated by the state individual mandate must be used to either fund robust state premium assistance for people between 200 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level or to provide a down payment for expanding coverage to immigrants. The Urban Institute estimates that an individual mandate would reduce individual market premiums by 10 percent and raise \$271 million in New York.⁸

Second, the state should conduct targeted outreach to communities in which people are already eligible for cost-sharing reductions and premium assistance but are not enrolled. There are parts of the state with higher uninsured rates than others – additional outreach and enrollment funding should be targeted towards those communities. These two steps would result in an increase in the number of enrollees into the individual market and thus bring premiums down for both the existing and future enrollees there.

B. New York’s Individual Market Carriers Do Not Need Another Big Rate Increase

The Department can also nurture the individual market by rejecting increase requests that are not based on actual market conditions. In their applications for 2020, plans asked for the smallest average increase in several years: 8.4 percent. However, as described in Table 3, this comes after several years of double-digit requests that turned out to be much higher than necessary. The Department has lowered those requests every year, but even those lower increases appear to have been too generous. For example, the average rate increase request in 2018 was 16.6 percent. The Department had lowered the carriers’ average requests to 14.5 percent, but that still meant double-digit premium increases for thousands of New Yorkers (see Table 2).

⁶ Altarum Healthcare Value Hub, “New Yorkers Struggle to Afford High Healthcare Costs; Support a Range of Government Solutions Across Party Lines,” Data Brief No. 37, March 2019, <https://www.healthcarevaluehub.org/advocate-resources/publications/new-yorkers-struggle-afford-high-healthcare-costs-support-range-government-solutions-across-party-lines/>

⁷ New York State Health Foundation, “The Rising Cost Burden of Employer-Sponsored Insurance in New York,” March 2018, <https://nyshealthfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/rising-cost-burden-employer-sponsored-insurance-NY.pdf>

⁸ Linda Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens, and John Holahan, “How Would State-Based Individual Mandates Affect Health Insurance Coverage and Premium Costs?,” July 20, 2018, <https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2018/jul/state-based-individual-mandate>



The carriers’ argument that they need additional increases to respond to rising medical costs is belied by the fact that their average medical loss ratios for 2018 barely hover above the statutory minimum—and in several cases didn’t even make that. The medical loss ratio (MLR) shows what proportion of premiums carriers spend on medical care for their members. In 2018, the average MLR for New York’s individual carriers was only 83 percent, barely above the minimum 82 percent required by State law (see Table 3).

| Table 3. Individual Market Rate Changes and Medical Loss Ratios, 2016-2019 | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| | Average Request | Average Approved | Number of Carriers | Average Medical Loss Ratio ⁹ |
| 2015 ¹⁰ | 12.5% | 5.7% (-54%) | 17 | 104.4% |
| 2016 ¹¹ | 10.4% | 7.1% (-32%) | 17 | 102.0% |
| 2017 ¹² | 18.0% | 16.6% (-8%) | 17 | 95.6% |
| 2018 ¹³ | 16.6% | 14.5% (-13%) | 15 | 83.0% |
| 2019 ¹⁴ | 24.0% | 8.6% (-72%) | 14 | N/A |

Further, carriers in New York have continuously improved their performance in the individual market despite receiving significantly lower rate increases than they argued for. This suggests a habit of overstating their needs. Nationally, 2018 was the most profitable year yet for the individual markets created by the ACA.¹⁵ This looks to be true in New York as well. The requests for 2020 may be smaller than in prior years—but they are still likely too high considering this history of rate inflation and the increasingly strong financial performance of companies participating in New York’s individual market.

As described in detail below, the Department should reject premium increases where the carriers fail to control medical costs or their administrative expenses or simply fail to make the statutory minimal payments on medical claims. Moreover, the Department should not provide “repeater” adjustments annually for one-shot policy changes, such as the elimination of the individual mandate or the cost sharing reduction payments.

⁹ MLRs are reported in Exhibit 13a, section D. The averages in Table 3 were calculated using the MLRs submitted in 2018 and 2019 for all carriers. Exhibit 13a provides MLRs for three years beginning with the first year in which data is complete, thus 2019 is not yet available.

¹⁰ Department of Financial Services, 2015 Individual Market Rate Action – Overall Summary, <https://myportal.dfs.ny.gov/web/prior-approval/summary-of-actions-premium-requests>.

¹¹ Department of Financial Services Press Release, July 31, 2015, https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1507311.

¹² Department of Financial Services Press Release, August 5, 2016, https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1608051.

¹³ Department of Financial Services Press Release, August 15, 2017, https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1708151.

¹⁴ Department of Financial Services Press Release, August 3, 2018, https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1808031.

¹⁵ Rebecca Pifer, “Payers had best individual market performance in 2018 since ACA began,” Healthcare Dive, May 8, 2019, <https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/payers-had-best-individual-market-performance-in-2018-since-aca-began/554366/>.



1. Medical trend estimates vary too much, and the State should require a standardized trend for either the entire state or the different rating regions

New York’s carriers need to do a better job controlling medical inflation. Their medical trend estimates in the 2020 rate applications range from 5.2 percent (Oscar) to 9.2 percent (United) with an average of 7 percent. Even when carriers work in the same region, they often estimate different trends. For example, Independent Health and Excellus both operate in Western New York, but estimate medical trends of 5.4 percent and 7.2 percent respectively. Further, for at least the third year in a row, the carriers argue that medical trend in New York will be higher than that expected by experts like Petersen-Kaiser (4.3 percent) or PwC (6 percent).¹⁶ Yet they provide no evidence about why this should be so year after year.

| Medical Trend Estimates | |
|---------------------------------------------------|------|
| Petersen-Kaiser (2019) | 4.3% |
| Milliman Medical Index¹⁷ (2018) | 4.5% |
| PwC¹⁸ (2020) | 6.0% |
| Segal Company¹⁹ (2019) | 6.6% |
| CVS/Caremark (2019) | 8.4% |

Another concern is that carriers’ predictions of medical trend often exceed actual medical trend.²⁰ Over time, this means that they have accumulated excessive rates. Even an overestimate of 1 percent every year is integrated into the new base rate and adds up to big increases over time that were not needed to accommodate medical needs.

Consumers, and the State, depend on health insurers to negotiate with providers and pharmaceutical companies to keep prices down. In New York, too many insurers argue that they cannot do this. This indicates that the State should take a more aggressive role in controlling prices. The Department should consider stepping in by imposing a standard medical trend on the entire market of 4.3 percent per the Petersen-Kaiser estimate cited by HealthFirst. Insurers and providers would then negotiate prices with the understanding that overall medical trend must stay at that rate. If this is not possible, the Department could consider imposing regional benchmark medical trends and holding the carriers to them.

2. Carriers not meeting the state minimum MLR (or in danger of not meeting it) should not receive rate increases

¹⁶ PwC, “Medical cost trend: Behind the numbers 2020,” June 2019, <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/health-industries/library/behind-the-numbers.html>.

¹⁷ Christopher Girod, Susan Hart, and Scott Wertz, “2018 Milliman Medical Index,” May 21, 2018, <http://www.milliman.com/mmi/>.

¹⁸ PwC, “Medical cost trend: Behind the numbers 2020,” <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/health-industries/library/behind-the-numbers.html>

¹⁹ Segal Consulting, “Increases in Medical and RX Costs Projected to Be Lower for 2019,” Fall 2018, <https://www.segalco.com/annual-health-plan-cost-trend-survey/2019/#PublicSector>.

²⁰ Segal Consulting, “Increases in Medical and RX Costs Projected to Be Lower for 2019,” Fall 2018, <https://www.segalco.com/annual-health-plan-cost-trend-survey/2019/#PublicSector>.



Underscoring HCFANY's belief that the Department has been too generous with rate requests in the past is that the following four carriers failed to meet the State's minimum MLR of 82 percent in 2018: CDPHP, Excellus, Healthfirst, and Independent Health. A fifth, Fidelis, barely managed to meet the minimum at 82.4 percent. HCFANY has argued in past rate comments that the Department not allow the carriers to treat the minimum as a goal, but instead as an absolute floor to be avoided. Thus in our individual comments, HCFANY has asked that the Department reject an increase—and consider rate cuts—for each of these carriers.

HCFANY also asks that the Department look closely at the track record carriers have in estimating their MLR. For example, in its rate application for 2018 CDPHP said its goal was an MLR of 89.9 percent; its actual MLR (according to its 2020 application) was 81.3 percent. Similarly, Fidelis estimated its MLR would be 90 percent in 2018 when its actual MLR was 82.4 percent. HCFANY respectfully requests that the Department approve smaller increases than requested or even rate decreases for carriers that have a history of overestimating their MLRs.

3. Carriers that previously received upward adjustments for cost-sharing reductions and losing the individual mandate penalty should not receive duplicative adjustments this year

None of the carriers asking for rate increases due to the loss of the individual mandate penalty or the federal government's failure to pay for cost-sharing reductions explain why they should get a further adjustment for those factors. When those federal actions were taken, the Department stepped in to help the carriers respond. The adjustments the Department provided at that time are now incorporated into the carriers' base rate. If the carriers have data showing that previous rate adjustments were inadequate, they should provide that in their application. Otherwise, it appears that most of the carriers have already incorporated the conditions of no mandate and no cost-sharing reduction payments into their base rates. HCFANY respectfully urges the Department to reject duplicative rate adjustments.

4. The Department should look closely at administrative costs for New York's plans and not approve premium increases for the plans with the highest administrative costs

There is excessive variation in expense ratios within the 2020 applications, which range from 8 percent (MetroPlus) to 15.7 percent (Healthfirst). Health insurers should demonstrate that they can control administrative costs before requesting premium increases, especially those that have expense ratios that are higher than the other carriers like Healthfirst. Further, most of the carriers report that their expense ratios are increasing. Controlling and lowering administrative costs is key to being good shepherds of consumers' premium payments. HCFANY respectfully requests that the Department closely scrutinize carriers that are moving in the wrong direction and consider setting a state goal for administrative costs that is no higher than 10 percent.



II. Specific Concerns in Healthfirst's Application

Healthfirst in New York's third largest individual market insurer with over 36,000 members in the downstate region. It has been a relative leader in controlling medical trend rates in the past and should be lauded for projecting a decline in the coming year. HCFANY also appreciates that Healthfirst voluntarily has dropped its requested profit ratio to 1.5 percent.

Healthfirst is a non-profit, provider-sponsored plan which should experience lower-than-average administrative costs—and yet, remarkably, it is posting the highest expense ratio—15.7 percent—across all the carriers in New York State. Healthfirst has a healthy member population and is a net payer into the federal risk adjustment program.

In its 2020 rate application Healthfirst seeks a 6 percent increase of its individual rates. This rate proposed rate increase follows two years of proposed double-digit rate increase—15 percent increase for 2019 and 22 percent for 2018. Fortunately, the Department reduced these proposals somewhat, and Healthfirst secured an approved rate increase of 17.7% in 2018 and 9.5 percent in 2020. But the cumulative impact of such large rate increases caused Healthfirst to fail to make the statutory minimum medical loss ratio by three percent. Because Healthfirst is not paying out enough claims for the premiums it is collecting, HCFANY urges the Department not to approve any rate increase for Healthfirst for 2020 and consider imposing a premium decrease instead.

HCFANY identified three issues that the Department should carefully review to ensure that Healthfirst's members are protected from unnecessarily high rate increases: medical loss ratio, administrative costs, and its request for an individual mandate adjustment.

A. Healthfirst's medical loss ratio is below the statutory minimum

Healthfirst had a medical loss ratio (MLR) of just 79.4 percent in 2018 and accordingly, owes its members rebates for that year. It now projects an MLR of just 83.5 percent for 2020—but there is now indication of how it intends to meet the statutory minimum should it get its requested rate increase.

It appears that Healthfirst was unable to make its MLR because it filed overly aggressive rate increases for the past two years. These rate increases were predicated, in part, on Healthfirst's prior MLRs, which were 99 percent in 2016 and 90.7 percent for 2017. The fact that the MLR has plummeted by 10 percent each year for the past three years indicates that the approved rates were too high.

B. Healthfirst has the highest administrative costs (or expense ratio) in the state

Healthfirst projects the highest expense ratio—15.7 percent—of all New York State carriers for the 2020 plan year. The average projected expense ratio in the individual market is 12.8 percent for 2020. Along with Fidelis and MetroPlus, Healthfirst has traditionally served New York's public insurance programs which means those plans provide a useful comparis.o.n



Healthfirst's expense ratio is much higher than either: Fidelis projects 9.1 percent and MetroPlus just 8 percent. Indeed, Healthfirst itself was able to operate with a 12 percent expense ratio in 2016. No explanation for Healthfirst's ballooning administrative costs is offered in its Actuarial Memorandum.

In addition, it appears that Healthfirst has failed to invest its administrative spending wisely. Its faulty premium collection program was the source of many consumer complaints until it was revamped in late 2018, and most recently, it has disclosed serious patient privacy breaches.²¹

In public comments on the Department's website, consumers appear to be particularly concerned about Healthfirst's administrative costs. As one consumer notes: "I will absolutely be dropping this insurance if it goes up by even a penny. Your CEO, Ms. Wang, makes 3.2 MILLION a year. Maybe trim some fat over there before you come to strip the finances of a working mother with preexisting conditions."

Another consumer asks the Department to require Healthfirst to transparently disclose why their administrative costs are so high, stating, "I do not believe that HealthFirst should raise its rates. Any rate change should come with more administrative transparency and/or better services, which have not been proposed or promised."

Finally, New York's consumers would like the Department to address Healthfirst's administrative expenses. This sentiment was best expressed by this public comment:

Healthfirst's request for a higher rate for the 2020 is a joke. The amount of fraud and price-inflation perpetuated in the healthcare system by these insurance companies is immoral. That these same companies would then request that [its] customers should have to pay more is despicable. Please do not approve this rate increase, and instead do your part to hold the insurance companies accountable for their inflationary policies, instead of continuing to bail them out and perpetuate this vicious cycle.

C. Healthfirst's request for an individual mandate adjustment should be rejected

Healthfirst is one of just three carriers that seeks an upward rate adjustment for the elimination of the individual market tax penalty. This adjustment should be disallowed. First, since New York's individual market is not constricting—even in a booming job economy—there is not support for the notion that there is any impact to the elimination of the tax penalty under the individual mandate. Second, any adjustment for the elimination of the penalty was issued last year, when the penalty was first implemented. Quite simply, this is not the gift that keeps on giving and the Department should reject this increase.

²¹ Jonathan Lamantia, "Healthfirst reports privacy breach," June 11, 2019, Crain's New York Business, <https://www.crainsnewyork.com/health-care/healthfirst-reports-privacy-breach>



Accordingly, HCFANY respectfully requests that Healthfirst's proposed 6 percent rate increase be rejected and that the Department considering issuing a rate reduction.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide our comments.

Very truly yours,

Amanda Dunker
Senior Health Policy Associate
Community Service Society of New York