



African Service Committee ○ Children's Defense Fund-New York
Coalition for Asian American Children + Families ○ Community Service Society of New York
Consumers Empire Justice Center ○ Entertainment Community Fund ○ Hispanic Federation
The Legal Aid Society ○ Make the Road New York ○ Medicare Rights Center
Metro New York Health Care for All Campaign ○ New Yorkers for Accessible Health Coverage
New York Immigration Coalition ○ Public Policy and Education Fund of New York/Citizen Action of New York
Raising Women's Voices-New York ○ Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy
South Asian Council for Social Services ○ Young Invincibles

June 28, 2023

Adrienne A. Harris, Superintendent
John Powell, Assistant Deputy Superintendent for Health
Frank Horn, Chief Actuary - Health
NYS Department of Financial Services
One Commerce Plaza
Albany, NY 12257

RE: Requested Rate Changes – Fidelis - FCNY-133657058

Dear Superintendent Harris, Assistant Deputy Powell, and Chief Actuary Horn:

Health Care For All New York (HCFANY) is a statewide coalition of over 170 organizations dedicated to achieving quality, affordable health coverage for all New Yorkers. HCFANY is grateful for the opportunity to submit comments on the 2024 rate requests submitted by New York's individual market carriers. HCFANY deeply appreciates the Department's annual efforts to keep rates as low as possible through its robust public prior approval process. The comments below are divided into sections: (I) General comments regarding New York's individual insurance market; and (II) specific comments on Fidelis' request.

I. General Comments Regarding New York's Individual Market Conditions

Health insurance and health care are a major part of most New Yorkers' budgets, and something over which consumers have poor information and limited freedom of choice. This year, the carriers seek an extraordinary 20 percent on average rate increase, which represents hundreds of millions of dollars for New York's consumers. Public rate review provides some balance of power between consumers and carriers, and carriers must be expected to follow both the letter and the spirit of the law. That means providing transparent, reasonable justifications supported by evidence to receive rate increases.

HCFANY recognizes the need for carriers to adjust for legitimate administrative expenses and reasonable medical trend increases. Many of the 2024 applications are opaque and rely on hidden assumptions. Indeed, most of New York's carriers have failed to provide adequate explanations for their requests. HCFANY urges the Department to scrutinize the carriers' respective actuarial memoranda closely and provide feedback about the transparency of their



assumptions. Rate increases should be rejected or pared back whenever inadequate information is provided in the carriers’ actuarial memoranda.

This general comment section describes the following conditions that are likely to influence the rates for the 2024 coverage year: (A) recent enrollment and rate request trends; (B) New York’s requests in the context of its peer states; (C) the impact of the State’s 1332 Waiver on enrollment; (D) the impact of the end of the Public Health Emergency’s continuous enrollment rules and other Covid-19 impacts; (E) the likely decline of Medical Loss Ratios due to the reduction in pent up demand utilization in the individual market; (F) the overstatement of medical trend; (g) elevated administration and cost projections; and (h) the need to better integrate the Department’s access and quality data.

A. New York’s individual market recent enrollment patterns and requests trends

New York’s individual market covers approximately 250,000 people, down from 323,000 in 2019 (see Table 1).¹ The pandemic and resulting economic downturn, (in which unemployment increased from 4.1 percent in February 2020 to a peak of 16.6 percent in May 2020 in New York State) caused a 19 percent decrease in enrollment between 2020 and 2021. Many consumers migrated to the Essential Plan and Medicaid due to the State’s effective implementation of the federal Public Health Emergency (PHE) provisions regarding continuous open enrollment and automatic renewal of public coverage.

Between 2022 and 2023, the individual market decreased by another 5 percent, reflecting the impact of the maintenance of continuous enrollment in public coverage under the PHE and a return to employer-sponsored coverage with record-levels of employment (4 percent as of April 2023).²

Table 1. On-Exchange Enrollment in New York’s Individual Market, 2017-2023		
	<i>Number of People Enrolled</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>
2017	309,195	-
2018	317,496	2.7%
2019	323,460	1.9%
2020	322,774	-0.2%
2021	261,242	-19.1%
2022	261,714	0.2%
2023	248,202	-5.2%

In 2024, 12 carriers seek to offer insurance in the individual market, indicating a robust and lucrative market. The individual market carriers are requesting a weighted average of a 20.4

¹ “2024 INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP REQUESTED RATE ACTIONS: Exhibit 18, Line 55.” 2024 – DFS Portal, myportal.dfs.ny.gov/web/prior-approval/ind-and-sg-medical/additional-information-2024.

² “Unemployment Rate in New York.” FRED, 23 May 2023, fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NYUR.



percent premium increase, even higher than last year’s remarkable 18.2 percent average request. These requests are far higher than requests from previous years: 8.6 percent in 2022; 11.8 percent in 2021, and 9.7 percent in 2020. The 2024 requests are also concerning because they range from 13.3 percent by MVP to a shocking 52.8 percent by Emblem. By contrast, the 2023 range was significantly smaller (6.9 percent to 34.6 percent).

<i>Plan</i>	<i>2023 Plan Members</i>	<i>2024 Proposed Rate Increase</i>
Emblem/HIP	7,147	52.75%
Independent Health	10,603	39.20%
CDPHP	5,210	23.50%
MetroPlus	11,598	23.39%
Highmark	6,612	22.58%
United	6,127	20.95%
Healthfirst	30,726	20.88%
HealthPlus	18,929	20.72%
Oscar	12,868	18.41%
NYQHC/Fidelis	90,250	18.15%
Excellus	25,677	15.19%
MVP	22,050	13.29%
Total Members/ Weighted Average Request	247,797	20.40%

New York’s individual market carriers have a history of seeking much larger premium increases than are ultimately approved (Table 3 below). The Department should endeavor to maintain this laudable tradition of reducing the premiums in order to shield consumers from double digit premium increase requests. Premium increases should be based on concrete evidence about the nature of costs and the carriers’ diligent efforts to control them. Many of the 2024 requests fail to provide adequate evidence to support their rate demands.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Requested Change</i>	<i>Approved Change</i>	<i>Difference</i>
2023	18.2%	9.1%	-50.0%
2022	10.8%	3.6%	-66.7%
2021	8.1%	1.5%	-81.5%
2020	9.7%	7.5%	-22.6%
2019	16.9%	6.3%	-62.7%

B. New York’s rate requests far surpass those of its peer states.

The New York carriers’ proposed rate increases are national outliers, far surpassing the requests of carriers in other states that have similar or significantly smaller risk pools. (Table 4



below.) New York is a large state, with the most carriers, yielding a highly competitive market. As a result, New York State is well positioned to control prices that would discourage New Yorkers from purchasing coverage on the individual market.

Washington and Michigan have comparable individual markets with similar numbers of carriers and risk pools, yet their carriers seek only 9.1 percent and 5.6 percent average rate increases, respectively. Only Oregon has a reinsurance program that supports its premium cost controls.³ It is also notable that CMS approved a 2.1 percent increase for Medicare Advantage plans for 2024. New York carriers offer no justification as to why their premiums are so much higher than those requested in peer states.

	<i>Average Request</i>	<i>Number of People in Individual Market</i>	<i>Number of Carriers (including off-exchange)</i>
New York	20.9%	248,202	12
Vermont ⁴	14.5%	30,119	2
District of Columbia ⁵	12.3%	12,749	3
Connecticut ⁶	12.4%	110,375	3
Washington ⁷	9.1%	250,000	14
Michigan ⁸	5.5%	404,419	12
Maryland ⁹	5.7%	471,000	4
Oregon ¹⁰	6.2%	169,525	6
Medicare Advantage ¹¹	2.1%	n/a	n/a

³ State Health Access Data Assistance Center, <https://www.shadac.org/publications/resource-state-based-reinsurance-programs-1332-state-innovation-waivers>

⁴ "Rate Review Home Page." *Vermont Gov.*, ratereview.vermont.gov/.

⁵ "Proposed Rates for January 2024 Health Plan Offerings on DC Health Link." *DISB*, disb.dc.gov/2024rates.

⁶ "Health Insurance Rates for 2024." *Connecticut Insurance Department*, 2023, www.catalog.state.ct.us/cid/portalApps/HCfiling2024.aspx.

⁷ "Fourteen Insurers Request Average 9.11% Rate Change for 2024 Individual Health Insurance Market." *Office of the Insurance Commissioner Washington State*, 2023, www.insurance.wa.gov/news/fourteen-insurers-request-average-911-rate-change-2024-individual-health-insurance-market?utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=govdelivery&utm_term=.

⁸ *Serff Filing Access - Michigan*, filingaccess.serff.com/sfa/search/binderSearchResults.xhtml.

⁹ "Health Carriers Propose Affordable Care Act (ACA) Premium Rates For ..." *Maryland Insurance Administration*, 9 June 2023, insurance.maryland.gov/Documents/newscenter/newsreleases/ACA-Premium-Rates-Proposed-2024-6122023.pdf.

¹⁰ "Health Insurance Companies File 2024 Health Insurance Rate Requests for Individual and Small Group Markets." *Division of Financial Regulation : Health Insurance Companies File 2024 Health Insurance Rate Requests for Individual and Small Group Markets : 2023 News Releases : State of Oregon*, dfr.oregon.gov/news/news2023/Pages/20230518-2024-health-insurance-rates.aspx.

¹¹ "2024 Advance Notice." *CMS Gov.*, www.cms.gov/medicare/health-plans/medicareadvtspecratestats/announcements-and-documents/2024-advance-notice.



Should the Department grant the proposed increases, the average monthly premiums would range from \$701 to \$1423 with a weighted average of \$790.¹² Many people, 61 percent, receive premium subsidies through the Affordable Care Act and the Inflation Reduction Act that will insulate them from some of the premium increase.¹³ However, almost 39 percent do not receive subsidies and pay full price, and high premiums lower the purchasing power provided by subsidies.

C. Impact of the State’s 1332 Waiver request on 2024 premiums should not be overestimated.

All the carriers seek a rate increase related to the expansion of the Essential Plan under the 1332 State Innovation Waiver, which was filed with the federal government on May 12, 2023. This Waiver seeks to expand the Essential Plan from its current income eligibility cap from 200 to 250 percent of the federal poverty level. According to State estimates, 70,000 people would migrate to the Essential Plan from the individual market, causing a .5 to 2.2 percent rate increase for remaining individual market members.¹⁴

For the following reasons, the expansion of the Essential Plan under the 1332 State Innovation Waiver necessitates either no upward adjustment at all, or only a conservative adjustment that is consistent with the State’s own public estimates about the impact of the Waiver on New York’s individual market: (1) an improper reliance on non-public estimates about the premium impact of the waiver; (2) the speculative assumption that the Waiver will be approved and implemented for the entire calendar year 2024; and (3) a lack of carrier-specific income eligibility data for their members.

First, the State has publicly issued a “conservative” estimate in its federal Waiver filing that the premium impact of the 1332 Waiver “is estimated between .5 percent and 2.2 percent.”¹⁵ However, the carriers’ submissions indicate that the Department has prepared a conflicting estimate of a 3.2 percent premium impact in an analysis apparently shared solely with the carriers. This analysis may be distorted because it relies on claims data solely from an outlier coverage year – 2022. In 2022, there were fewer enrollees in the individual market. Additionally, those who remained were sicker (due to Covid) and were likely utilizing care at a higher level because of the combined phenomena of higher utilization and pent-up demand from prior pandemic years.

More importantly, any analysis that the Department provides to the carriers for the purpose of generating their prospective rates should be simultaneously shared with the public to

¹² “2024 INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP REQUESTED RATE ACTIONS: Exhibit 18, Line 56.” 2024 - DFS Portal, myportal.dfs.ny.gov/web/prior-approval/ind-and-sg-medical/additional-information-2024.

¹³ “Health Insurance Coverage Update: Impact of ARPA Subsidies.” p.6, *NYSOH Enrollment Data*, Apr. 2023, info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/enrollmentdata.

¹⁴ “Health Insurance Coverage Update: Impact of ARPA Subsidies.” p.6, *NYSOH Enrollment Data*, Apr. 2023, info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/enrollmentdata.

¹⁵ “NY 1332 Waiver Application.” p. 25, *NY State of Health*, info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/sites/default/files/American%20Rescue%20Plan%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20English.pdf?clid=.



ensure a transparent rate review process. In addition, assumptions governing the State’s rate decisions should be consistent with the publicly disclosed estimates filed with the federal government in its Waiver application. To rely on private, in lieu of public, analytics undermines the transparency and integrity of both the Department of Financial Services and a robust public prior approval process.

Second, it is unclear whether any adjustment should be made based on the speculative assumption that the Waiver will be approved for the entire 2024 plan year. The State only filed the application in mid-May, and several procedural steps need to occur before any approval is likely to come down from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), including: a “Completeness Review” by HHS and the Treasury Departments (45 days); a Federal Comment Period (30-days); and the Application Review process conducted by HHS and Treasury Departments (180 days). In short, the Waiver is unlikely to be approved in less than eight months – well into the next calendar year.¹⁶ Given this uncertain timing, any adjustment for the Waiver should be delayed until 2025 when the State has certainty about whether the Waiver has been approved and when it is actually implemented.

Third, the Waiver only impacts plan members who fall between the expanded income eligibility cap of 200 to 250 percent of the federal poverty level. Only one carrier, Healthfirst, was forthcoming about the percentage of their membership that would be impacted by the Waiver.¹⁷ If the Department allows an upward adjustment in 2024 related to the Waiver, the adjustment should be made in a manner that reflects the relative target membership of the respective carriers.

For example, it seems unlikely that the high-cost CDPHP has a significant number of Waiver-eligible members, yet it is seeking an unsubstantiated 5.9 percent increase due to its anticipated decline in members with incomes between 200-250 percent of FPL. By contrast, the lower-cost, H+H-sponsored MetroPlus seeks only a 1.6 percent adjustment. Given their premium differentials and members’ price sensitivity, it is highly likely that MetroPlus would witness a larger decline in the relevant income cohort than CDPHP.

Accordingly, the Department should design and implement a coherent allocation based on the carriers’ respective enrollee cohorts.

CDPHP	5.9%
Fidelis	3.2%
IHBC	3.2%
MVP	3.2%

¹⁶ Center for Medicaid & Medicare Services, “Steps for States Considering a 1332 Waiver,” May 2019, <https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Steps-for-States-Considering-A-1332-Waiver.pdf>

¹⁷ “2024 INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP REQUESTED RATE ACTIONS: Actuarial Memo, Healthfirst, p. 8.” 2024 - DFS Portal, myportal.dfs.ny.gov/web/prior-approval/ind-and-sg-medical/additional-information-2024.



United	3.1%
HIP/Emblem	2.9%
Healthfirst	2.9%
HealthPlus	2.9%
Oscar	2.8%
MetroPlus	1.6%
Excellus	1.3%
Highmark	0.5%
Average	2.8%

Given the speculative nature of the Waiver’s approval and its timing, the Department should award no adjustment, a pro-rated adjustment, or at the very least, an adjustment that has been publicly disclosed and filed with the federal government and the public.

D. The end of the Covid-19 Public Health Emergency requires a downward adjustment.

The end of the Covid-19 Public Health Emergency (PHE) necessitates a downward adjustment for four reasons: (1) the end of the continuous coverage requirements under the federal PHE means increased healthy (lower-income) individual market membership; (2) the amelioration of Covid-19’s morbidity in enrollees; (3) the dissipation of demand for deferred care; and (4) the elimination of cost-sharing protections for Covid-19 care will diminish claims utilization.

First, the Department asked carriers to estimate the impact the unwinding of the PHE's continuous coverage rules would have on individual market enrollment. During the pandemic, New York stopped requiring people in public health insurance programs to renew (which requires verifying income). Between 2020 and 2021, nearly 62,000 people left the individual market while 1.7 million and 328,000 more people enrolled in Medicaid and the Essential Plan, respectively.

Altogether 9.3 million New Yorkers are now renewing their coverage for the first time since 2020 and are doing so in an economy that is greatly improved.¹⁸ Medicaid and Essential Plan renewal over the next year (June 2023 – June 2024) will reveal higher incomes for many people, making them no longer eligible for public coverage. According to New York State of Health Marketplace officials, Qualified Health Plan (QHP) enrollment is already up by 5,324 people for the very first renewal period, between May 15 to June 15, 2023.¹⁹ If this early rate of QHP enrollment is maintained, an additional 70,000 people would return to the individual market in 2024.

¹⁸ New York State Department of Health, “New York Public Health Emergency and Continuous Coverage Unwind Plan, May 10, 2023, slide 3, available at: <https://info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/sites/default/files/NYHealth%20Webinar%20-%20Keeping%20New%20Yorkers%20Covered.pdf>

¹⁹ Department of Health correspondence with the authors, June 14, 2023.



Expert researchers at the Urban Institute have arrived at a similar conclusion. The Urban Institute estimates that over one million people will lose Medicaid coverage in New York State as a result, and that 5.5 percent of people losing Medicaid (about 60,000 for New York) will join the individual market.²⁰ The Urban Institute experts indicate that states like New York that operate their own Marketplaces will be able to seamlessly assist people formerly receiving public insurance to return to the individual market.²¹ The return of younger and healthier Medicaid and Essential Plan enrollees will be beneficial for New York’s individual market.

By contrast, the carriers’ rate adjustments and supporting actuarial memoranda displayed confusion and inconsistency. Two carriers (HealthPlus and United) requested a positive adjustment, while five carriers noted a downward adjustment, and the other five made no adjustment at all for the end of the PHE. One carrier (Independent Health) did not seem to understand the question, failing to acknowledge the termination of the continuous coverage requirement. The Department should address this confusion by providing a uniform negative adjustment that reflects the likely return of at least 70,000 enrollees to the individual market.

MetroPlus	-4.8%
Oscar	-2.2%
Healthfirst	-1.0%
MVP	-0.3%
IHBC	-0.2%
CDPHP	0.0%
HIP/Emblem	0.0%
Excellus	0.0%
Fidelis	0.0%
Highmark	0.0%
United	0.4%
HealthPlus	1.6%
Average	-0.03%

Second, the carriers’ submissions—citing 2022 claims data—continue to assert that they should be offered an upward adjustment for Covid-19, principally due to the increased costs of vaccinations and increased utilization related to pent-up demand for deferred care. But these assertions should be discounted since Covid-related morbidity and care has declined and is likely to continue to decline in the 2024 plan year.

²⁰ Matthew Buettges and Andrew Green, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Expiration on All Types of Health Coverage,” December 2022, Urban Institute, <https://www.urban.org/research/publication/impact-covid-19-public-health-emergency-expiration-all-types-health-coverage>.

²¹ Urban Institute, “What will happen to Medicaid enrollees’ health coverage after the Public Health Emergency?: Updated Projections,” March 2022, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/what-will-happen-to-medicaid-enrollees-health-coverage-after-the-public-health-emergency_1_1.pdf.



The CDC marked the end of the Covid-19 Public Health Emergency (PHE) in May 2023. The prevalence and severity of Covid-19 cases across the country, and in New York State specifically, has decreased substantially. In New York, the seven-day test positivity rate hit an all-time high of 22.2 percent in January 2022, then dropped to 1 percent within a month, and has stayed steadily under 10 percent ever since.²² In addition to the decreased prevalence of positive Covid test results, the CDC notes that as of May 2023, there are “more tools and resources than ever before to better protect ourselves and our communities.”²³ In light of this evidence of declining Covid-related morbidity, the Department should adopt a uniform downward adjustment.

Third, it is important to understand that the carriers were still witnessing inflated utilization in their 2022 claims data as people caught up on deferred care that was not possible during the worst of the pandemic. In short, the end of the Covid-19 PHE marks a fundamentally different point in the pandemic than what is reflected in the 2022 claims data relied upon by the carriers.

Fourth, for the 2024 plan year, the Department asked carriers to estimate the impact of change in expected unit cost and utilization of Covid-19 testing and vaccination. Last year, the Department asked for a more comprehensive accounting of the impact of Covid-19 including an adjustment for inflated claims data. As described above, the cost of Covid-19 treatment in 2024 is expected to be significantly lower than the 2022 data would suggest because of the combined reduction in frequency and severity of Covid-19 cases in New York.²⁴ Moreover, utilization is likely to decline because of the Department’s Circular Letter to the carriers which re-implements cost-sharing for Covid-19 testing and treatment, effective May 2023.²⁵ Extensive research documents that even small amounts of cost-sharing reduce health care utilization.²⁶

HealthPlus	-1.1%
Healthfirst	-1.0%
HIP/Emblem	-0.8%
Fidelis	-0.8%

²² “Positive Tests over Time, by Region and County.” *Department of Health*, coronavirus.health.ny.gov/positive-tests-over-time-region-and-county.

²³ “End of the Federal COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (PHE) Declaration.” *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*, www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/end-of-phe.html#:~:text=The%20federal%20COVID%2D19%20PHE,to%20align%20with%20data%20changes.

²⁴ “Covid-19 Daily Hospitalization Summary.” *New York State Department of Health*, coronavirus.health.ny.gov/daily-hospitalization-summary.

²⁵ “Insurance Circular Letter No. 3 (2023): Coverage of Covid-19 Testing and Immunization Following the Expiration of the Federal Public Health Emergency.” *Department of Financial Services*, www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/circular_letters/cl2023_03.

²⁶ “The Effects of Premiums and Cost Sharing on Low-Income Populations: Updated Review of Research Findings.” *KFF*, 30 Jan. 2018, www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-effects-of-premiums-and-cost-sharing-on-low-income-populations-updated-review-of-research-findings/.



MetroPlus	0.0%
Oscar	0.0%
Excellus	0.0%
Highmark	0.1%
CDPHP	0.1%
IHBC	0.1%
United	0.2%
MVP	0.5%
Average	-0.03%

Accordingly, the Department should approve a much more aggressive negative adjustment than those described by the carriers in Table 7 to accurately reflect the change in costs and utilization of Covid-19 related services amongst individual market members in the 2024 plan year.

E. Medical Loss Ratios

Consistent with the experience of carriers throughout the United States, New York plans experienced very high profits in 2020, followed by much lower profits in 2021 and 2022. The carriers’ medical loss ratios (MLRs) show how much revenue they spent on health care for members as opposed to administrative costs and profit. In 2020, the average MLR was only 85.8 percent, and four plans were at or below the State’s minimum 82 percent (below which the plan must pay rebates). In 2022, the average MLR was 101.9 percent, meaning the plans spent more on health care services than they received in premium revenues.

<i>Plan</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>Average</i>
CDPHP	92.4%	95.8%	112.2%	103.5%	103.8%
Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York	87.6%	82.0%	95.6%	104.6%	94.1%
Excellus	83.0%	84.0%	97.5%	99.6%	93.7%
Fidelis	78.0%	79.6%	89.4%	104.2%	91.1%
Healthfirst	87.3%	84.5%	103.2%	92.1%	93.3%
HealthPlus	88.3%	69.0%	80.4%	108.6%	86.0%
Highmark	90.8%	90.8%	108.6%	115.5%	105.0%
IHBC	74.6%	77.2%	100.7%	112.2%	96.7%
MetroPlus	85.4%	87.7%	113.8%	102.2%	101.2%
MVP	95.5%	101.1%	99.0%	91.8%	97.3%
Oscar	96.0%	91.6%	99.2%	91.0%	93.9%
United	99.8%	88.1%	96.7%	97.5%	94.1%



Average	88.2%	86.0%	99.7%	101.9%	95.8%
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However, high medical loss ratios do not necessarily mean the carriers need large rate increases for 2024. Some of the carriers are asking for rate adjustments that would give them very low medical loss ratios in 2024. For example, Emblem is requesting a 53 percent rate increase so that it can lower its expected medical loss ratio in 2024 to 84 percent from the 105 percent it is reporting for 2022. Emblem should not ask consumers to bear such a large rate increase to achieve this low MLR. Instead, it should aim for a gentler increase that will more slowly get its MLR back to normal. Further, some plans with very high MLRs in 2022 are already estimating that their MLR will be lower in 2023.

<i>Carrier</i>	<i>Projected 2023 MLR</i>	<i>Projected 2024 MLR</i>
Highmark	102.6%	90.5%
United	97.9%	89.9%
MetroPlus	90.9%	89.9%
HealthPlus	85.4%	88.9%
CDPHP	95.6%	89.6%
Oscar	91.3%	88.5%
Excellus	90.7%	87.8%
Healthfirst	89.8%	86.7%
MVP	87.6%	86.6%
Fidelis	97.2%	84.7%
Independent Health	105.2%	84.0%
HIP/Emblem	104.8%	82.1%
Average	95.6%	87.5%

Accordingly, the Department should proceed cautiously when estimating appropriate MLRs for the 2024 plan year.

F. Medical trend

New York’s carriers provide a variety of estimates of medical trend that indicate that they do little to control health care costs over time. Medical trend is an estimate of how much their claims will increase based on changes in prices and utilization. The promise of insurance is that it aggregates its enrollees’ bargaining power to control price negotiations with providers, drug makers, and medical equipment manufacturers. On average, New York’s individual market carriers seek a 7.6 percent medical trend.

<i>Carrier</i>	<i>Estimated Medical Trend</i>
HIP/Emblem	14.2%



HealthPlus	9.0%
Highmark	9.0%
United	8.8%
MetroPlus	8.3%
CDPHP	7.9%
MVP	7.8%
Healthfirst	6.2%
Oscar	5.8%
Excellus	5.5%
IHBC	5.2%
Fidelis	3.1%
Average	7.6%

The Department has an important role in controlling medical cost inflation. To this end, it should impose greater standardization in medical trend estimates within New York. There is significant variation in the trend estimates among the carriers, from 3.1 percent to 14.2 percent (see Table 10 above). The carrier with the highest estimated medical trend, Emblem, is a major New York City HMO that covers hundreds of thousands of City employees and should be able to better control its individual market business trend given its enormous negotiating power with providers.

In setting the 2024 rates, the Department should protect consumers’ interests by approving an average consistent with average estimated medical trend amongst New York carriers as well as the national projected health expenditures for 2024 of 7.6 percent.²⁷

G. Administrative costs and profit

Administrative costs and profit are another area in which there is excessive variation in carriers’ rate applications. On average, the carriers expect 11.5 percent of their rates to go toward administrative costs (Table 11). Independent Health expects the biggest proportion to go toward administrative costs, at 17 percent. Highmark expects the lowest, at 3.1 percent. The Department should consider capping administrative costs at 11.5 percent, the average.

<i>Carrier</i>	<i>Projected Administrative Costs</i>	<i>Requested Profit/Surplus</i>
HIP/Emblem	17.0%	1.5%
Healthfirst	14.0%	0.5%
Independent Health	13.9%	2.0%

²⁷ Keehan, Sean P. “National Health Expenditure Projections, 2022–31: Growth To Stabilize Once The COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Ends.” Health Affairs, vol. 42, no. 7, July 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff>.



Fidelis	13.2%	0.5%
United	11.9%	1.5%
MetroPlus	11.3%	0.5%
CDPHP	10.8%	2.0%
Excellus	10.7%	1.5%
Oscar	10.5%	0.9%
HealthPlus	9.1%	2.0%
Highmark	3.1%	1.0%
Average	11.5%	1.3%

Profit and surplus requests range from 0.5 to 2 percent. The Department capped profit and surplus at 0.5 percent for the 2023 rates. It should do the same for 2024.

H. Complaint and quality data

HCFANY also urges the Department to incorporate its own complaint and quality information into the rate review process. The Department publishes the New York Consumer Guide to Health Insurers each year so that consumers can see which plans perform the best.

However, the Guide does not include complaint and quality data for all plans available through the individual market. The Department could easily gather this data from its sister agency, the New York State Department of Health, or its own External Appeals database, located on the Department’s website. The Department should revamp its Consumer Guide to include all individual market carriers – whose customers would benefit the most from its contents during the course of their enrollment decisions.

The report provides data on how many complaints the Department receives for each company, how many coverage appeals are filed and what proportion result in reversals of the plan’s decisions, and how often appeals are escalated outside of the company to the State’s External Appeal program. When plans have high reversal rates, it sometimes means that they are denying care without any basis and then spending administrative resources on appeals that should not be necessary. The report also shows how well the companies do on performance measures such as access to preventive care or ensuring people with chronic conditions are receiving the care they need.

The state should integrate these independent measures of product value into its prior approval review. If plan members are unable to access care, that company should be asked to improve in advance of authorizing large rate increases.

II. Fidelis

New York Quality Healthcare Corporation, commonly known as “Fidelis,” is a for-profit health insurer that offers HMO plans in New York’s individual market. It previously operated as



a popular not-for-profit carrier until 2018, when it was acquired by the national for-profit Centene corporation over consumer objections that the acquisition would result in substantial premium increases.

Fidelis's individual market plans serve all of New York's insurance rating regions. With 79,767 members in 2023, Fidelis is the largest carrier in the individual market. That said, it experienced a substantial (16 percent) decline from 2022, when it had over 95,000 members. This decline may reflect the price sensitivity of Fidelis's enrollees in the wake of the Department's 12.4 percent rate increase for 2023.

Despite this substantial rate increase, Fidelis continues to boast the second lowest premiums in the State in 2022 at \$594 a month on average. Fidelis has a healthier-than-average membership and will again be making a payment into the risk adjustment program this year.

Fidelis is requesting an 18.2 percent rate increase for 2024, slightly below the carriers' average of 20.9 percent, but still far higher than necessary. Fidelis's actuarial memorandum is one of the clearest submitted through this year's prior approval process and the Department should direct other carriers to it as a model. For example, Fidelis provides more detail about its trend calculations – which it projects to be 6.8 percent – than many other carriers.

A. Fidelis has a history of asking for unnecessary rate increases that casts doubt on the credibility of its assumptions.

Fidelis has a track record of seeking large rate requests that have been appropriately reduced by the Department. For example: in 2019, Fidelis sought a 38.6 percent increase that the Department cut to 13.7 percent; and in 2021, it sought an 18.8 percent increase that the Department cut to 1.6 percent. The Department has approved the following rate increases over the past few years: 2019, 13.7 percent; 2020, 3.9 percent; 2021, 1.6 percent; 2022, -0.1 percent; and 2023, 12.4 percent.

For the past three years, Fidelis's average MLR is 91.7 percent: 79.6 percent in 2020; 89.4 percent in 2021 and 104.2 percent in 2022. This average is being tugged upward because in 2022, Fidelis's MLR was 104.2 percent – probably due to post-pandemic pent-up demand. In response, the Department approved a substantial rate increase of 12.4 percent (half of what Fidelis sought) for 2023. Given this substantial increase, the healthy risk of Fidelis's enrollees, its significant market share, and its low-cost provider network, the Department should only authorize a modest rate increase for Fidelis for 2024.

B. Fidelis is proposing administrative costs of 13.2 percent and a profit of 0.5 percent.

For 2024, Fidelis seeks an expense ratio of 13.2 percent, which would leave it with an MLR of 86.3 percent. This MLR is lower than the average requested by other carriers (87.4 percent) and is far too low considering its past failures (in 2020 and before) to request reasonable rate changes and to meet MLR minimums. Moreover, Fidelis's proposed 12.2 administrative



ratio is a full percent higher than the average of all the rest of the individual market carriers. Market wide, the carriers' expense ratios have been creeping up from 11 percent to 12 percent on average. The Department should act in the interest of consumers and reduce the expense ratio to 11 percent or below to better insulate consumers from inflationary insurance costs.

Some of Fidelis's administrative costs (0.20 percent) are broker commissions—a reduction from .68 percent in 2022. We are grateful that Fidelis is limiting these commissions but urge the Department to disapprove all broker fees. In the individual market, the state provides extensive marketing and enrollment assistance. New Yorkers can easily research and select individual market plans at nystateofhealth.ny.gov, and those who prefer assistance in person can access it in every part of the state. Consumers should not be asked to pay brokers to duplicate these services. Moreover, the Actuarial Memorandum does not indicate how many members in the individual market actually use broker services. Without a detailed description of the number of enrollments facilitated by brokers, this adjustment should be disallowed.

For the first time, Fidelis seeks a .5 percent profit, 1 percent less than it sought in prior years. The Department should approve this request.

C. Fidelis's claim that the end of the Public Health Emergency will have no impact should be rejected.

Fidelis's application does not incorporate a downward adjustment for the migration of consumers back to its qualified health plan products from Medicaid/Essential Plan as a result of the end of the Public Health Emergency. Indeed, its application is entirely silent on this matter. But Fidelis, as the largest and second cheapest carrier, stands to benefit the most from the migration of individuals from Medicaid/Essential Plan back to the individual market. Its own enrollment declines during the pandemic from 103,982 members in 2019 to 79,767 members in 2023 should be ample evidence about how many members it stands to restore over the next year.

Accordingly, the Department should provide a significant downward adjustment for the end of the Public Health Emergency.

D. Fidelis's 3.2 percent upward adjustment for the 1332 Waiver should be reduced to no more than 2.2 percent consistent with New York State's public filings with the federal government.

Fidelis seeks a full 3.2 percent rate adjustment for the migration of its members between 200 and 250 percent of federal poverty level to the Essential Plan should the Waiver be granted. Fidelis provides no detail in its actuarial memorandum about why such a large increase should be provided. Moreover, this request is a full percent larger than the State's public estimate of a 2.2 percent premium impact in public filings.

The Department should award no premium adjustment based on speculative assumptions about the impact of the 1332 Waiver – which has yet to be approved. In any event, if it does



approve an upward adjustment, it should not be greater than those publicly disclosed by the State in its filings with the federal government – 2.2 percent.

E. Fidelis’s -0.76 percent downward adjustment for Covid-19 utilization should be enhanced or granted.

Fidelis seeks a .76 percent downward adjustment in recognition of the reduced morbidity and utilization related to Covid-19 care and treatment—the fourth largest decrease sought by an individual market carrier. This adjustment should be further increased. As Fidelis notes, there will be “fewer ‘mass vaccination’ programs compared to [the] 2022 experience period” as well as a reduction in Covid-related claims.

F. Fidelis quality and appeal data

The Department’s consumer guide still does not include any quality, complaint or external appeal information about Fidelis in its annual Consumer Guide. Given that Fidelis is the largest individual market carrier, the absence of reporting its data in the Department’s Consumer Guide is a disservice to its public.

Indeed, the Department could easily gather this data from its sister agency, the New York State Department of Health, or its own External Appeals database, located on the Department’s website. This database indicates that Fidelis has been the subject of 4364 external appeals, of which 1,993 (46 percent) were overturned in full or part. This data should be incorporated in the Department’s Guide.

In summary, the Department should revamp its Guide to include all individual market carriers – since those consumers would most benefit from the contents of the Guide in informing their enrollment decisions.

G. Enrollees’ concerns should be honored.

Last, but not least, we urge the Department to consider the voices of Fidelis’s enrollees, who so eloquently have voiced their objection to its proposed rate increase.

- “I am devastated to learn that Fidelis wants to not only raise their prices, but a \$100 per month increase? We can barely put food on the table for our kids and pay our bills, living paycheck to paycheck, inflation, utilities, groceries, etc? The insurance coverage isn't even good! Where is all of this money going? Who is pocketing all of this? I cannot afford this. I am going bankrupt. Please stop this. This is not right.”
- “I just received a notice that my premiums may be increased by \$400.00 PER MONTH. I simply cannot afford that increase. If you do increase my premiums, I will need to drop my insurance coverage immediately. I just can't afford \$2,400.00 per month. It's not possible on my budget. Don't you realize people are hurting financially, or do you just not



care? \$2,400.00 per month for VERY BASIC coverage is outrageous, unreasonable, and an unrealistic amount. Please keep my premium at its current level. Otherwise, you're forcing me into a very difficult situation that puts my family's health at risk Thank you.”

- “I already pay \$500 for the worst health plan available with an over \$6,000 deductible. Raising prices even more will put health insurance out of reach for so many NYers that don't have an employer paid plan. I've already had to sacrifice so much of my medical care due to these insane costs. The insurance companies do not need more money from us, please do not let this happen. We need more affordable options, not less affordable options.”

Thank you for your consideration of these comments.

Very truly yours,

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