



African Service Committee ○ Children's Defense Fund-New York
Coalition for Asian American Children + Families ○ Community Service Society of New York
Consumers Empire Justice Center ○ Entertainment Community Fund ○ Hispanic Federation
The Legal Aid Society ○ Make the Road New York ○ Medicare Rights Center
Metro New York Health Care for All Campaign ○ New Yorkers for Accessible Health Coverage
New York Immigration Coalition ○ Public Policy and Education Fund of New York/Citizen Action of New York
Raising Women's Voices-New York ○ Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy
South Asian Council for Social Services ○ Young Invincibles

June 28, 2024

Adrienne A. Harris, Superintendent
John Powell, Assistant Deputy Superintendent for Health
Frank Horn, Chief Actuary - Health
NYS Department of Financial Services
One Commerce Plaza
Albany, NY 12257

RE: Requested Rate Changes – Fidelis - FCNY-134078333

Dear Superintendent Harris, Assistant Deputy Powell, and Chief Actuary Horn:

Health Care For All New York (HCFANY) is a statewide coalition of over 170 organizations dedicated to achieving quality, affordable health coverage for all New Yorkers. HCFANY is grateful for the opportunity to submit comments on the 2025 rate requests submitted by New York's individual market carriers. HCFANY deeply appreciates the Department's annual efforts to keep rates as low as possible through its robust public prior approval process. The comments below are divided into sections: (I) General comments regarding New York's individual insurance market; and (II) specific comments on Fidelis' request.

I. General Comments Regarding New York's Individual Market Conditions

Health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket health care costs comprise a major part of most New Yorkers' budgets. Consumers with job-based coverage have employers, brokers and agents who can negotiate the best premiums, scope, and amount of coverage possible for their employees. By contrast, consumers in the individual market have limited information about premium costs and the quality of coverage and have no bargaining power to negotiate affordable premiums and out-of-pocket costs. As a result, it is solely the responsibility of State Department of Financial Services (the "Department") officials through the annual rate review process to ensure that health insurance and health care for New Yorkers in the individual and small groups market remains affordable and accessible.

The Department's responsibility has never been more paramount than this year, when the carriers seek an extraordinary 16.6 percent on average rate increase—following two prior years when the largest rate increases ever witnessed by New Yorkers were approved (13.5 percent and



9.7 percent in 2024 and 2023, respectively). New York’s inflated insurance premiums cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars and burden individual and family budgets.

This general comment section describes the following conditions that are likely to influence the rates for the 2025 coverage year: (A) rate request trends; (B) migration to the individual market as a result of the ongoing unwinding of the Public Health Emergency; (C) New York’s requests in the context of its peer states; (D) Medical Loss Ratios; (E) the overstatement of medical trend; (F) elevated administration and cost projections; (G) the degrading quality of carriers’ rate request documentation; and (H) the need to better integrate the Department’s access and quality data.

A. New York’s individual market recent request trends

In 2025, New York’s individual market carriers seek a weighted average of a 16.6 percent premium increase—following two years of equally inflated requests (20.9 percent and 18.7 percent in 2024 and 2023, respectively). These requests are far higher than requests from previous years: 11.2 percent in 2022; 11.7 percent in 2021, and 8.4 percent in 2020. New York’s individual market carriers have a history of seeking much larger premium increases than are ultimately approved (Table 1 below).

<i>Year</i>	<i>Requested Change</i>	<i>Approved Change</i>	<i>Difference</i>
2024	20.9%	13.5%	-35.5%
2023	18.7%	9.7%	-48.2%
2022	11.2%	3.6%	-67.8%
2021	11.7%	1.5%	-84.6%
2020	9.2%	6.8%	-26.1%
2019	24.0%	8.6%	-64.2%
2018	17.7%	13.9%	-21.5%
2017	19.3%	16.6%	-14.0%

Historically, the Department has scrutinized the carriers’ outsized rate requests – often paring them back by over 50 percent (e.g., plan years 2022, 2021, 2019). As described in further detail below, the individual market has substantially stabilized. Accordingly, for the 2025 plan year, HCFANY urges the Department to return to its practice of critically reviewing the carriers’ requests and paring them back substantially.



New York has a robust individual insurance market with 12 carriers participating. Table 2 displays the extreme range in the rate request applications from an 8.8 percent proposed premium increase by United to a shocking 51 percent proposed increase by Emblem.

Table 2. 2025 Individual Market Rate Requests			
<i>Plan</i>	<i>2024 Plan Members</i>	<i>2024 Approved Rate Increase</i>	<i>2025 Proposed Rate Increase</i>
Emblem/HIP	5,022	25.1%	51.0%
Highmark	4,081	13.0%	30.9%
MetroPlus	13,406	17.5%	28.3%
Independent Health	11,493	25.3%	27.7%
Oscar	11,570	7.9%	25.5%
Excellus	28,591	12.2%	19.5%
MVP	24,200	6.5%	19.2%
CDPHP	4,717	12.1%	18.7%
Healthfirst	54,463	12.5%	16.8%
HealthPlus	25,138	8.6%	14.5%
NYQHC/Fidelis	118,207	15.9%	9.8%
United	6,133	12.2%	8.8%
Total Members/ Average Request	307,021	13.5%	16.6%

Premium increases should be based on concrete evidence about the nature of costs and the carriers' diligent efforts to control them. As described below in section G, many of the 2025 requests fail to provide adequate evidence to support their rate demands. We urge the Department to redress this ongoing issue in its instructions to carriers for the 2026 plan year.

B. Migration to the individual market as a result of the ongoing unwinding of the Public Health Emergency

New York's individual market covered approximately 307,000 people when the carriers submitted their 2025 rate applications, up from 237,000 last year (see Table 1).¹ The Covid-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn caused a 19 percent decrease in individual market enrollment between 2020 and 2021 when many consumers migrated to the Essential Plan and



Medicaid due to the State’s effective implementation of the federal Public Health Emergency (PHE).

Under the PHE, New York stopped requiring people in public health insurance programs to renew their coverage. During the PHE, nearly 62,000 people left the individual market while 1.7 million and 328,000 more people enrolled in Medicaid and the Essential Plan, respectively.

Table 3. Enrollment in New York’s Individual Market, 2017-2024		
	<i>Number of People Enrolled</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>
2017	309,195	-
2018	317,496	2.7%
2019	323,460	1.9%
2020	322,774	-0.2%
2021	261,242	-19.1%
2022	261,714	0.2%
2023	237,314	-9.3%
2024	307,021/267,693 ¹	26.8%/12.8%

The unwinding of the PHE began in June 2023 and is set to continue through June 2024. As of March 2024, 82 percent (4,146,000) of the over five million renewals initiated by New York State of Health (NYSOH) have been completed.² Last year, based on the first month of the renewal period, HCFANY predicted that approximately 70,000 people would return to the individual market in 2024. According to the data provided in the carrier’s 2025 rate applications, 69,707 New Yorkers did return to the individual market.

The return of younger and healthier Medicaid and Essential Plan enrollees should improve the risk and utilization mix in the individual market. Healthfirst’s actuarial memorandum documents this phenomenon. The members migrating from Medicaid products represented 18 percent of total QHP member months. Healthfirst found that migrators had lower costs PMPM for bronze and gold plans when compared to all other members. While none of the other carriers presented comparable information, it is reasonable to assume that the influx of new members into the individual market has improved its risk profile. In 2025, the Department should

¹ Carriers’ rate applications cite 307,021 individual market enrollees. As of May 5, 2024, there are 233,151 QHP enrollees according to NYSOH Enrollment data, <https://info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/enrollmentdata>. According to data provided to HCFANY by the Department, as of April 30, 2024, there are 34,542 off-exchange enrollees. Together, that is approximately 267,693 individual market enrollees following the expansion eligibility for the Essential Plan.

² *New York State Public Health Emergency Unwind Dashboard*, New York State of Health, March 2024, <https://info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/PHE-unwind-dashboard>.



require each carrier to follow Healthfirst’s example and describe the health status and utilization of recently enrolled members.

In May of 2023, New York submitted the 1332 State Innovation Waiver application to expand the Essential Plan to New Yorkers with incomes up to 250 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), which was implemented on April 1, 2024. As a result, newly eligible New Yorkers migrated from the individual market to the Essential Plan.

According to State Marketplace data, 233,151 people were enrolled in Qualified Health Plans through the Marketplace, as of May 2024. Data provided by the Department indicated that individual market “off-exchange” enrollment as of April 30, 2024, was approximately 34,542.³ Accordingly, total individual market enrollment is approximately 268,000 people – a 13 percent increase over 2023.

This 13 percent increase in memberships of the individual market will be further stabilized by the 1332 State Innovation Waiver Application’s Insurer Reimbursement Implementation Plan (IRIP). The IRIP will provide federal funding to offset any premium increases in the individual market related to the migration of individuals with incomes between 200-250 percent of the Federal Poverty Level, who are assumed to be both healthier and lower utilizers of health care.

Accordingly, the Department should carefully evaluate each carrier’s rate request with the following factors in mind: (1) there appears to be a 13 percent increase in enrollment; (2) these members are believed to have a healthier risk profile; and (3) the IRIP will adequately compensate the carriers for any losses related to the migration of former individual market members to the Essential Plan.

C. New York’s rate requests far surpass those of its peer states.

The New York carriers’ proposed rate increases are national outliers, far surpassing the requests of carriers in other states that have similarly sized or significantly smaller risk pools. (Table 4 below.) New York is a large state, with the most carriers, yielding a highly competitive market. As a result, New York State is well positioned to control prices that would discourage New Yorkers from purchasing coverage on the individual market.

Should the Department grant the increases proposed by New York’s carriers, the average monthly premiums would range from \$731 to \$1,666 with an average of \$980. Over half of consumers (58 percent) are somewhat insulated from these increases because they receive premium subsidies through the temporary enhancements to the Affordable Care Act.⁴ However, not only are these enhancements set to expire, but the remaining 42 percent of New York’s enrollees do not receive subsidies and pay full price.⁵ Nationally, the average premium for a

³ CSS correspondence with the Department, June 18, 2024.

⁴ The American Rescue Plan and the Inflation Reduction Act enhanced these subsidies to be both more generous and extend to more people.

⁵ *2024 Marketplace Open Enrollment Period Public Use Files – 2024 OEP State-Level Public Use File*, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, March 22, 2024, <https://www.cms.gov/data-research/statistics-trends-reports/marketplace-products/2024-marketplace-open-enrollment-period-public-use-files>.



benchmark plan in 2024 is \$477. In New York, the average premium for a benchmark plan is \$736, 150 percent higher, making it the fifth most expensive state for marketplace insurance in the country.⁶

CMS has approved a 3.7 percent increase for Medicare Advantage plans for 2025. Carriers in the states have likewise sought relatively reasonable rate increases (See Table 4.) For example, Washington and New York have comparable individual markets with similar numbers of carriers and risk pools, yet Washington’s carriers seek only an 11.3 percent average rate increase. Only two of the states in Table 4, Oregon and Maryland, have reinsurance programs that explain why their carriers’ rate requests are significantly lower than those filed in New York.⁷ New York carriers do not provide an adequate explanation in their public rate filings as to why their premiums are so much higher than those requested in peer states or at the federal level.

With the IRIP, New York has additional leverage to alleviate premium increases in the individual market related to the purported erosion of risk related to the 1332 Waiver.

Table 4. Proposed 2025 Rate Increases in State Individual Markets			
	<i>Average Request</i>	<i>Number of People in Individual Market</i>	<i>Number of Carriers</i>
New York	16.6%	307,000	12
Vermont ⁸	14.0%	33,780	2
Washington ⁹	11.3%	284,300	13
Oregon ¹⁰	9.3%	126,400	6
Connecticut ¹¹	8.3%	141,100	3

⁶ *Average Marketplace Premiums by Metal Tier, 2018-2024*, KFF, <https://www.kff.org/affordable-care-act/state-indicator/average-marketplace-premiums-by-metal-tier/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D>.

⁷ *State-based Reinsurance Programs via 1332 State Innovation Waivers*, State Health Access Data Assistance Center, November 2023, <https://www.shadac.org/publications/resource-state-based-reinsurance-programs-1332-state-innovation-waivers>.

⁸ *View Filings*, Vermont Rate Review, May 2024, <https://ratereview.vermont.gov/view-filings>.

⁹ *Thirteen insurers request average 11.3% rate change for 2025 individual health insurance market*, Office of the Insurance Commissioner Washington State, May 29, 2024, https://www.insurance.wa.gov/news/thirteen-insurers-request-average-113-rate-change-2025-individual-health-insurance-market?utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=govdelivery&utm_term=.

¹⁰ *Oregon Health Rates – 2025 Rates*, Oregon.gov Division of Financial Regulation, May 2024, <https://dfr.oregon.gov/healthrates/pages/index.aspx>.

¹¹ *Connecticut Insurance Department Releases Health Insurance Rate Request Filings for 2025*, CT Insurance Department, June 7, 2024, https://portal.ct.gov/cid/home/press-releases/2024-press-releases/2024-06-07?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ACA+Health+Insurance+Rate+Request+Filings+for+2025&utm_content=



Maryland ¹²	6.7%	259,600	5
District of Columbia ¹³	6.3%	9,800	2
Medicare Advantage ¹⁴	3.7%	n/a	n/a

New York does not incorporate an affordability standard through its rate review process. Rhode Island offers a model for affordability standards that insurers must meet to have their rates approved. Their standards include increased spending on primary care and working towards comprehensive payment reform. As a part of the payment reform, Rhode Island carriers must maintain contracted hospital price increases below inflation plus one percent. In addition, the carriers must ensure that at least half of the average rate increase will be for expected quality incentive payments.¹⁵ A 2019 Health Affairs study of the implementation of these standards found an average net reduction in quarterly health care spending of \$55 per enrollee.¹⁶

Given New York’s carriers’ extremely high rate requests, in 2026 the Department should propose to amend the prior approval statute to implement an affordability standard as a part of the rate review process. Evaluating proposed rate increases based on affordability criteria such as income levels and premium tax credits would allow the Department to better hold insurance companies accountable for the affordability and quality of their products. Improved affordability of insurance products could reduce the number of uninsured New Yorkers impacted by medical debt.

In addition, the State should implement benchmarks for health care growth to ensure that premium dollars are being correctly spent. For example, New York’s carriers pay an outsized portion of their premiums for expensive hospitalization instead of primary care. Nationally, New York is the state with the highest amount of health care expenditures per capita at \$14,007 compared to the \$10,191 national average.¹⁷ New York also spends 39.3 percent of its health

[ACA+Health+Insurance+Rate+Request+Filings+for+2025+CID_ca97c7ca9abeb9f84bf56c7357f4e8f0&utm_source=CID+Campaign+Monitor&utm_term=Read+on+CTGOV&language=en_US.](https://www.healthrates.mdinsurance.state.md.us/)

¹² *Insurance Administration Rate Review*, Maryland.gov, June 2024, <http://www.healthrates.mdinsurance.state.md.us/>.

¹³ *Information About Proposed Rates for January 2025 Health Plan Offerings on DC Health Link*, District of Columbia Department of Insurance, Securities & Banking, <https://disb.dc.gov/page/information-about-proposed-rates-january-2025-health-plan-offerings-dc-health-link>.

¹⁴ *2025 Medicare Advantage and Part D Rate Announcement*, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, April 1, 2024, <https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/2025-medicare-advantage-and-part-d-rate-announcement>.

¹⁵ Butler, Johanna, *Disrupting Hospital Price Increases: Using Growth Caps in Insurance Rate Review*, National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP), December 2021, <https://nashp.org/disrupting-hospital-price-increases-using-growth-caps-in-insurance-rate-review/#:~:text=A%202019%20Health%20Affairs%20review,%2455%20from%202010%20to%202016>.

¹⁶ Baum, Aaron et al. *Health Care Spending Slowed After Rhode Island Applied Affordability Standards To Commercial Insurers*, Health Affairs, February 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05164>.

¹⁷ *Health Care Expenditures per Capita by State of Residence*, KFF, 2020,



care expenditures on hospital care, more than the national average of 37.8 percent.¹⁸ Nationally, primary care accounts for 35 percent of health care visits annually. However, only around five percent of all health care expenditures are for primary care services.¹⁹ Many states have already adopted policies to increase spending on primary care over time.²⁰ Rhode Island was the first state to mandate commercial insurers increase primary care spending by 1 percent per year, with the goal of reaching 10 percent of the total cost of care. As a result, primary care spending in Rhode Island grew by 37 percent from 2008 to 2012. During the same period, total medical spending fell 14 percent.²¹

New York carriers' 2025 rate requests exceed the requests of other states, making it a national outlier. The Department should continue its practice of cutting the carriers' requests to what is reasonable, particularly given the growth and stabilization of New York's individual market. To better protect consumers in future years, the Department should propose to amend the prior approval statute to implement an affordability standard as a part of the rate review process. In addition, the State should implement benchmarks for health care growth to ensure that premium dollars are being correctly spent on primary care in lieu of expensive hospitalizations. These changes would benefit consumers but also help bring down overall healthcare system costs.

D. Medical Loss Ratios

Consistent with the experience of carriers throughout the United States, New York plans experienced very high profits in 2020, followed by much lower profits from 2021 to 2023. The carriers' medical loss ratios (MLRs) show how much revenue they spent on health care for members as opposed to administrative costs and profit. For 2023, the carriers reported an unweighted average MLR of 99 percent.

In their filings, the carriers project a much lower unweighted average MLR of 93.4 percent for the 2024 plan year, indicating a substantial stabilization in the wake of two years of historic rate increases.

Table 5. Medical Loss Ratios in New York's Individual Market, 2021-2025

<https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/health-spending-per-capita/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D>.

¹⁸ *Distribution of Health Care Expenditures by Service by State of Residence (in millions)*, KFF, 2020,

<https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-of-health-care-expenditures-by-service-by-state-of-residence-in-millions/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Hospital%20Care%22,%22sort%22:%22desc%22%7D>.

¹⁹ *Implementing High-Quality Primary Care Rebuilding the Foundation of Health Care*, National Academy of Science, Engineering and Medicine, 2021, <https://www.nap.edu/read/25983/chapter/3>.

²⁰ Koller, C. & Khullar, D. *Primary Care Spending Rate - A Lever for Encouraging Investment in Primary Care*, The New England Journal of Medicine, 2017, <https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1709538>.

²¹ *Primary Care Spending in Rhode Island*, Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner – State of Rhode Island, January 2014, <https://ohic.ri.gov/sites/g/files/xkgbur736/files/documents/Primary-Care-Spending-generalprimary-care-Jan-2014.pdf>.



<i>Plan</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>Projected 2024</i>	<i>Requested 2025</i>
Highmark	108.6%	117.4%	121.1%	111.0%	91.8%
Emblem	95.6%	104.6%	116.2%	99.3%	82.1%
IHBC	100.7%	116.2%	113.3%	96.0%	83.5%
CDPHP	112.2%	116.1%	99.6%	96.4%	85.5%
Excellus	97.5%	99.6%	96.8%	90.9%	87.8%
Oscar	99.9%	90.0%	96.1%	93.0%	85.8%
MetroPlus	113.8%	102.2%	95.8%	89.0%	88.4%
Fidelis	89.4%	104.2%	95.4%	83.2%	84.6%
MVP	99.0%	92.4%	95.2%	87.1%	86.6%
United	96.7%	97.8%	87.8%	95.1%	88.1%
HealthPlus	81.9%	80.8%	86.0%	89.9%	89.7%
Healthfirst	89.3%	86.3%	84.8%	90.4%	91.2%
Average	98.7%	100.6%	99.0%	93.4%	87.1%

Somewhat elevated MLRs do not necessarily mean the carriers should receive another large rate increase in 2025. Nearly all the carriers reporting very high MLRs in 2023 are already estimating that their MLR will be lower in 2024. Some carriers seek unnecessarily low MLRs. For example, Emblem requests a 51 percent rate increase to drive its MLR from 116.2 percent (reported so far for 2023) to just 82.1 percent in 2025. The Department should require carriers like Emblem to reexamine its own operational practices that make it a market outlier instead of making its enrollees bear such a large rate increase to achieve this low MLR.

Accordingly, the Department should rigorously evaluate the carriers' projected MLRs for the 2025 plan year and return to its historic practice of protecting individual market consumers by curbing the carriers' proposed requests dramatically.

E. Medical trend

New York's carriers provide a variety of medical trend estimates that indicate that they are capable of meaningfully controlling health care costs over time. Medical trend is the portion of the rate request based on changes in prices and utilization. The purpose of insurance is to both spread risk and to aggregate its enrollees' bargaining power to leverage price negotiations with providers, drug makers, and medical equipment manufacturers. On average, New York's individual market carriers seek a 9 percent medical trend, far exceeding national norms. (See Table 6.)



Table 6. Estimated 2025 Medical Trend by Carrier, New York	
<i>Carrier</i>	<i>Estimated Medical Trend</i>
CDPHP	14.2%
Emblem	11.7%
Highmark	9.8%
United	9.6%
MetroPlus	8.9%
Excellus	8.7%
IHBC	8.4%
HealthPlus	8.3%
Fidelis	7.9%
MVP	7.7%
Healthfirst	7.0% ²²
Oscar	5.9%
Average	9.0%

The Department has a critical role in controlling medical cost inflation. To this end, it should impose greater standardization in medical trend estimates within New York. There is significant variation in the trend estimates among the carriers, from 5.9 percent to 14.2 percent (see Table 6). In 2023, New York carriers were granted an 8.1 percent average medical trend. In 2024, the carriers requested an average of 7.8 percent medical trend which the Department lowered to an average of 7.1 percent.

At the national level, medical cost inflation is considerably lower than those proposed by New York’s carriers. (See Table 7). Like some New York carriers, these experts identified the rising cost of GLP-1 drugs as driving costs up in 2024. Segal, Milliman, and CMS provided a breakdown of medical and pharmacy trends used to calculate the composite. PWC only provided a composite trend.

Table 7. Average Annual Medical Trend Projection, National Sources			
<i>Source</i>	<i>Medical Trend (60%)</i>	<i>Pharmacy Trend (40%)</i>	<i>Composite</i>

²² Healthfirst 2025 Rate Application, Actuarial Memorandum, page 4. See Healthfirst carrier-specific letter for details on inconsistencies within its projected medical trend.



Segal ²³	7.3%	9.9%	8.3%
PWC ²⁴	n/a	n/a	7.0%
Milliman ²⁵	7.1%	5.6%	6.5%
CMS ²⁶	5.2%	6.8%	5.8%
Average			6.9%

New York’s rates have already incorporated increases based on 2024 trend rate of 7.1 percent. Both real and medical inflation have tapered in the past year. Accordingly, in setting the 2025 rates, the Department should secure downward trend adjustments across all carriers and enforce a trend cap of 6.9 percent that is consistent with expert national projections.

F. Administrative costs and profit

Administrative costs and profits are another area in which there is excessive variation in carriers’ rate applications. On average, the carriers seek to spend 11.4 percent of their rates on administrative costs (Table 7). Emblem expects the biggest proportion to go toward administrative costs, at 16 percent. Highmark expects the lowest, at 7 percent. New York has a robust individual market, with many carriers, and the state is in a strong position to improve affordability for consumers by capping administrative costs.

Accordingly, the Department should consider setting a ceiling expense ratio ceiling of 10 percent.

<i>Carrier</i>	<i>Projected Administrative Costs</i>	<i>Requested Profit/Surplus</i>
Emblem	16.0%	2.0%
CDPHP	13.5%	1.0%
IHBC	13.5%	3.0%
Fidelis	12.8%	1.0%
Healthfirst	12.6%	1.0%

²³ *What Are the Projected 2024 Health Plan Cost Trends*, Segal, September 2023, <https://www.segalco.com/consulting-insights/2024-health-plan-cost-trend-survey>.

²⁴ *Medical Cost Trend: Behind the Numbers 2024*, PWC, <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/health-industries/library/behind-the-numbers.html>.

²⁵ *Healthfirst 2025 Rate Application*, Actuarial Memorandum, page 4.

²⁶ *National Health Expenditure Projections 2023-2032*, CMS, <https://www.cms.gov/files/document/nhe-projections-forecast-summary.pdf>.



MVP	11.9%	1.5%
Excellus	10.7%	1.5%
Oscar	10.4%	3.8%
MetroPlus	10.1%	1.5%
United	9.6%	5.0%
Anthem	8.3%	2.0%
Highmark	7.0%	1.0%
Average	11.4%	2.0%

Profit and surplus requests range from 1 to 5 percent. The Department capped profit and surplus at 0.5 percent for the 2023 rates but did not do so in 2024. This contributed to consumers experiencing the highest rate increases since the power of prior approval was restored to the Department by the State Legislature.

Facing a third round of unprecedented rate increases, the Department should consider protecting consumers and return to its prior practice of capping profit and surplus at 0.5 percent for the 2025 plan year.

G. The Degrading Quality of Carriers’ Rate Request Documentation

In order to have a meaningful public rate review process, the Department and the public should be able to review clear and comparable filings. But the quality of the rate filings by the carriers continues to deteriorate – with many actuarial memoranda providing little or no meaningful justifications for the carrier’s requests.

In the carrier’s rate applications for 2025, there are many cases where there is an inadequate amount of information for consumers and consumer advocates to evaluate and comment on their claims. Further, there were several cases of: inconsistent information between the carriers’ actuarial memoranda and their exhibits; typos; and disregard of the Department’s instructions around what should not be included in the 2025 rates due to the IRIP.

Proffering comprehensible actuarial memoranda is attainable. For example, Healthfirst provided a comprehensive and detailed actuarial memorandum. In addition to listing the premium adjustments the carrier seeks, it also provides its sources, calculations, and justification for each adjustment. This should be the standard among individual market carriers. By contrast, MVP’s actuarial memorandum provides a very brief description of medical trend with no numbers, sources, or justification that is unique to 2025.

Starting in 2026, the Department should address this problem by issuing a standardized template Actual Memorandum and requiring the carriers to comprehensively detail their rate



increases in a standardized memorandum format with citations. The Department should reject rate increases for carriers whose memoranda include redactions or do not follow the template

H. Complaint and quality data

HCFANY also urges the Department to incorporate its own complaint and quality information into the rate review process. The Department publishes the New York Consumer Guide to Health Insurers each year so that consumers can see which plans perform the best. The report provides data on how many complaints the Department receives for each company, how many coverage appeals are filed and what proportion result in reversals of the plan’s decisions, and how often appeals are escalated outside of the company to the State’s External Appeal program. When plans have high reversal rates, it sometimes means they deny care without any basis and then spend administrative resources on appeals that should not be necessary. The report also shows how well the companies do on performance measures such as access to preventive care or ensuring people with chronic conditions are receiving the care they need.

The Department should also revise this Guide so that it lives up to its “consumer” title by including complaint and quality data for all plans available through the individual market. For example, the largest individual market carriers are omitted from the Guide, including Fidelis, Healthfirst and MetroPlus. The Department could easily gather this data from its sister agency, the New York State Department of Health, or its own External Appeals database, located on the Department’s website. Including all individual market carriers would benefit those consumers who are most likely to use it to support their enrollment decisions.

The state should integrate these independent—consumer facing--measures of product value into its prior approval review. If plan members are unable to access care, that company should be asked to improve in advance of authorizing large rate increases.

II. Fidelis

New York Quality Healthcare Corporation, commonly known as “Fidelis,” is a for-profit health insurer that offers HMO plans in New York’s individual market. It previously operated as a popular not-for-profit carrier until 2018, when it was acquired by the national for-profit Centene corporation over consumer objections that the acquisition would result in substantial premium increases. Fidelis has a healthier-than-average membership and again will pay into the federal risk adjustment program.

Fidelis’s individual market plans serve all of New York’s insurance rating regions. According to its filing, Fidelis has 118,207 members. Accordingly, Fidelis continues to be the largest carrier serving the individual market. Since 2023, Fidelis’ qualified health plan experienced a 48.2 percent increase in enrollment, surpassing its recent high in 2020.

In 2024, Fidelis continues to boast the second lowest premiums in the State (\$666 a month on average). In 2025, Fidelis seeks a 9.8 percent rate increase. For the reasons below, the Department should carefully review this request and consider reducing it.



A. Fidelis has a history of asking for inflated rate increases that casts doubt on the credibility of its medical loss ratio (MLR) assumptions.

Since its acquisition by Centene, Fidelis has sought highly inflated rate requests that the Department appropriately reduced. For example: in 2019, Fidelis sought a 38.6 percent increase that the Department cut to 13.7 percent; and in 2021, it sought an 18.8 percent increase that the Department cut to 1.6 percent. The Department has approved the following rate increases over the past few years: 2019, 13.7 percent; 2020, 3.9 percent; 2021, 1.6 percent; 2022, -0.1 percent. More recently, however, the Department approved relatively high requests of 12.4 and 15.9 percent in 2023 and 2024, respectively.

For the past three years, Fidelis's average MLR is 96.3 percent: 89.4 percent in 2021, 104.2 percent in 2022, and 95.4 percent in 2023. And in 2020, Fidelis had a 79 percent MLR, far below the statutory minimum. Accordingly, Fidelis' past three-year average is anomalous because it experienced a one-time 104.2 percent MLR in 2022, due to post-COVID pent-up demand. The Department has thoroughly remediated this through two consecutive rate approvals for the 2023 and 2024 plan years.

Given the substantial rate increases for 2023 and 2024, the healthy risk of Fidelis's enrollees, its significant market share, and its low-cost provider network, the Department should consider only authorizing a modest rate increase – or no increase at all – for Fidelis for 2025.

B. Fidelis is proposing administrative costs of 12.8 percent.

For 2025, Fidelis seeks an expense ratio of 12.8 percent, which would leave it with an MLR of just 84.6 percent. This MLR is lower than the average requested by other carriers (87.1 percent) and is far too low considering its past failures (in 2020 and before) to request reasonable rate changes and to meet MLR minimums.

Fidelis's proposed 12.8 administrative ratio is over a percent higher than the average of all the rest of the individual market carriers. The Department should act in the interest of consumers and should only approve expense ratio requests that are 10 percent or less to insulate consumers from inflationary insurance costs.

Some of Fidelis's administrative costs (0.27 percent) are broker commissions—an increase from 0.20 percent in 2023. HCFANY urges the Department to disapprove all broker fees. In the individual market, the state provides extensive marketing and enrollment assistance. New Yorkers can easily research and select individual market plans at nystateofhealth.ny.gov, and those who prefer assistance in person can access it in every part of the state through free, state-certified Navigators and other enrollment assisters. New York's individual market consumers should not be asked to pay brokers to duplicate these services. Moreover, the Actuarial Memorandum does not indicate how many Fidelis members in the individual market



use broker services. Without a detailed description of the number of enrollments facilitated by brokers, this adjustment should be disallowed.

C. Fidelis is proposing a profit of 1.0 percent.

Fidelis has been granted a 0.5 percent profit in 2023 and 2024. In 2025, it is proposing a profit of 1.0 percent.

As described above in Section F. of the General Comments, the Department should consider returning to its practice of capping profit at 0.5 percent as it has done in the past for all carriers.

D. Fidelis seeks a 7.9 percent medical trend in 2025.

Fidelis has a projected medical trend of 7.9 percent for 2025. Fidelis' actuarial memorandum seeks a 19.1 percent trend in inpatient hospital costs compared to the average of 12.6 percent among carriers who specify this measure. Similarly, Fidelis claims a 19.9 percent prescription drug trend compared to the 11.4 percent average among carriers who specified a prescription drug trend. No justification is provided to support such an extreme trend request in the actuarial memorandum.

The Department should also consider that Fidelis' trend projections exceed the average of other carriers by a large margin, indicating its medical trend factors are inflated. Moreover, Fidelis' actuarial memorandum indicates that it has migrated its pharmacy business to Express Scripts, a pharmacy benefit manager. The Department should require Fidelis to elucidate these savings in its filings and pass them on to its enrollees through a downward rate adjustment.

The Department should likewise disallow any component of Fidelis' trend assumptions that assume "increased demand" in utilization due to the 1332 Waiver's cost sharing reductions. There is no evidence to show that any purported increased demand will impact utilization in a manner that will adversely impact costs. Indeed, the only comprehensive research in the academic literature indicates that the reverse is true, and that Fidelis will actually experience cost savings due to increased medication adherence in a healthier membership.²⁷ Accordingly, the Department should reject any upward adjustment related to the impact of the cost sharing reductions for the 2025 plan year.

As described above in Section E. of the General Comments the Department should consider reducing the carrier's trend adjustment to 6.9 percent, consistent with expert projections for 2025.

E. Fidelis' quality and appeal data should be considered when reviewing its rate request.

²⁷ Cong, et al. *Association of Co-pay Elimination With Medication Adherence and Total Cost*, AJMC, June 2021, <https://www.ajmc.com/view/association-of-co-pay-elimination-with-medication-adherence-and-total-cost>.



The Department's consumer guide does not include any quality, complaint or external appeal information about Fidelis in its annual Consumer Guide. Given that Fidelis is the largest individual market carrier, the absence of reporting its data in the Department's Consumer Guide is a disservice to its public.

The Department could secure this data from its sister agency, the New York State Department of Health, or its own External Appeals database, located on the Department's website. This database indicates that Fidelis has been the subject of 5037 external appeals, of which 2,297 (46 percent) were overturned in full or part. This data should be incorporated in the Department's Guide.

In summary, the Department should revamp its Guide to include all individual market carriers – since those consumers would most benefit from the contents of the Guide in informing their enrollment decisions.

F. Enrollees' concerns should be honored.

Last, but not least, we urge the Department to consider the concerns of Fidelis's enrollees, who so eloquently have voiced their objection to its proposed rate increase.

- “PLEASE do not approve the rate increase. It is absurd; our insurance is TERRIBLE. My husband and I have never used it, even once. We pay out of pocket for our monthly medications and doctors appointments because it is actually cheaper to purchase them out of pocket than it would be to use the insurance. We have not found any doctors who take our insurance, so we do not have a PCP, and we have paid out of pocket for any specialists.”
- “If the rate increase goes through I will strongly consider not signing up for health insurance. I have a strict budget. \$350 a month is too much to pay on my income. If I have a health emergency I cannot pay the \$4700 deductible. I am lucky to be in good health, but there is no way I can afford the \$9200!?! out of pocket max. Whether I have health insurance or not, I am facing guaranteed medical debt. I have already faced it once. It took me years to stabilize my finances which I did during covid when insurance premiums were lowered enough that I could pay all my bills. Seriously, why pay more into a program that does not prevent me from going into debt? Health insurance that guarantees debt through high premiums deductibles is not worth paying for.”
- “The premium I already pay is a huge jump from last years] cost with a much higher deductible... if the preposed premium rate change takes effect, I will simply discontinue my health coverage as it will be too large a burden on my income. I already have to budget carefully to make the current costs make sense for my income level in the city as it is. After the recent rate hike... how can they possibly justify a further inflated price?”

Thank you for your consideration of these comments.



Very truly yours,

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